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THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS, MORALS, AND RELIGION.

Translated from the "Philosophische Propädeutik" of G. W. F. Hegel.

[The notes in small type are by the translator.]

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. The object of this science is the human Will in its relations as particular will to the universal will [to the will which is right and just, or in accordance with Reason]. As Will, the spirit stands in a practical relation to itself. The *practical* procedure through which it brings determination into its indeterminateness, or posits other determinations of its own in the place of those already existing in it without its coöperation, is to be distinguished from its *theoretical* procedure.

"Determinations"—modifications, changes, characteristics, &c. To determine—to give characteristics to anything. It is a very important technical expression in Hegel: "*Bestimmen*" is the German. "Indeterminateness"—lack of characteristics. "Determination" is what distinguishes one thing from another—that by which one somewhat differs from another—that by which it is what it is.

"Posits"—"sets up" or "establishes"; "places."

§ 2. Consciousness as such is the relation of the Ego to an object; this object may be internal or external. Our Knowing contains objects, some of which we obtain a knowledge of through sensuous perception—others, however, which have their origin in the mind itself. The former, taken together, constitute the *sensuous* world; the latter, the *intelligible* world. Judicial [*rechtlichen*=legal], ethical and religious conceptions belong to the latter.

"*Rechtlichen*," here translated "judicial" and "legal," is a difficult word to translate exactly into English. One is tempted to render "*Rechts*" by "Jurisprudence" instead of "Rights." But "*Rechts*" seems to have a wider meaning. In English we have two sets of words: one, the common, colloquial, social words, derived from the Saxon; the other, the technical, scientific, precise vocabulary derived from Latin. In Germany, the former vocabulary has been elevated also into the latter, and is hence more comprehensible to the individual not classically educated.

§ 3. In the relation of the Ego and object to each other, the Ego is (1) *passive*, in which case the object is regarded as the cause of the determinations in the Ego, and the particular ideas [*Vorstellungen*] which the Ego has, are attributed to the impression made upon it by the immediate objects before it. This is the **THEORETICAL** consciousness. Whether it be in

the form of *perception*, or of *imagination*, or of the *thinking activity*, its content is always a given and extant somewhat—a content having existence independent of the Ego. (2) On the contrary, the Ego manifests itself as PRACTICAL consciousness when its determinations are not mere “ideas” and thoughts, but issue forth into external existence. In this process the Ego determines the given things [or objects, so that the former is active and the latter passive]; i. e. the Ego is the cause of changes in the given objects.

“*Vorstellungen.*” The common expression for this word in English is “ideas.” “Representations in the mind” is the exact signification. In using the term “idea” to render *Vorstellung*, I have borrowed a term which stands for the highest in Hegel’s Philosophy. It will not, however, produce confusion here as I have always taken care to use it in the plural, or else to modify it by some appellation in such a way as to leave no doubt what is meant. (See Hegel’s First Principle, Jour. Sp. Phil. Vol. III. pp. 350 & 369.)

§ 4. The practical power, as such, determines itself from within, i. e. through itself. The content of its determinations belongs to it and it recognizes that content for its own. These determinations, however, are at first only internal, and for this reason separated from the external reality, but they are to become external and be realized; this is done through the [conscious] ACT. By such ACT, internal practical determinations receive externality, i. e. external Being. Conversely, this process may be regarded as the cancelling of an extant externality and the bringing of the same into harmony with the internal determination.

“Content”=“that which is contained”; nearly the same use of the word that was somewhat in vogue in King James’ time. It saves a troublesome circumlocution.

“Conscious Act”=“*Handeln*” or “*Handlung*”: an act that contains exactly what was intended by the person who willed it. In § 9 the distinction is drawn between “That” (from “*Thun*=to do) or “Deed” and “*Handlung*”=intentional or voluntary act.

§ 5. The internal determination of the practical consciousness is either *impulse* or *will* proper. Impulse is a natural self-determination which rests upon circumscribed feelings, and has a limited finite end in view which it cannot transcend; in other words, it is the not-free, immediately determined, *lower Appetite*, according to which man ranks as a creature of nature. Through *Reflection* he transcends Impulse and its limitations, and compares it not only with the means of its

gratification, but he also compares these means one with another and the impulses one with another, and both of these with the object and end of his own existence. He then yields to the decision of Reflection and gratifies the impulse, or else represses it and renounces it.

A very important distinction drawn between man as ruled by Impulse or Appetite and the same as possessed of the power of Reflection. In the former case he acts through immediate constraint, i. e. he is fixed or determined—controlled—by his nature or constitution. In the latter case he exercises the power to arrest these glib impulses and summon them into court, and weigh them (1) one with another; (2) each of them with the means of its gratification; (3) both of these—impulse and means—with what he considers the object and end of his existence independent of all these impulses. Thus it happens that by Reflection man exercises “free moral agency” and becomes in this exercise a truly free being when he learns how to act so as not to contradict by one act the next one; i. e. how to act consistently or universally.

§ 6. The real will, or the *higher faculty of appetite*, is (1) pure indeterminateness of the Ego, which as such has no limitation nor a content which is immediately extant through nature, but it is indifferent toward any and every determinateness; (2) the Ego can at the same time pass over to a determinateness and make choice of some one or other, and then actualize it.

The “pure indeterminateness” here spoken of is the existence of the Ego as the *possibility* of resolution, the possibility of annulling any given state or activity and assuming another. It has no “fixed constitution or nature.”

§ 7. The abstract freedom of the Will consists in this very indeterminateness or identity of the Ego with itself, wherein a determination occurs only in so far as the Ego makes it its own [assimilates it] or posits it within itself; and yet in this act remains self-identical and retains the power to abstract again from each and every determination. There may be presented to the Will, from without, a great variety of incitements, motives, and laws; but man, in following the same, does this only in so far as the Will itself makes these its own determinations, and resolves to actualize them. This, too, is the case with the determinations of the *lower* appetites, or with what proceeds from *natural* impulses and inclinations.

“Abstract freedom of the Will”—“abstract” because this is freedom only of form. The freedom to do as one pleases,—such freedom is caprice or arbitrariness, and quickly gets entangled by its own inconsistent acts. The content of its doing and acting is not self-consistent, i. e. universal, and hence its freedom is only turned against itself—a freedom that enslaves itself. (See § 11.)

Yet even in following impulses, or motives, there is *formal freedom*; there is self-determination. For the external determination is *never* an internal one except through the activity within. If the Ego does not determine himself, the *motive* can never exist, even, for him; still less can it *do* anything in him. The Ego must actualize the motive or else it remains forever a mere potentiality.

This is a very important consideration: *Motives* are mere *potentialities* seen by the Mind. If the thing is already done, it excites no impulse to do it again. It is not done and yet *ought* to be done: the Mind alone can see an “ought”—and how? Manifestly by annulling the limits of the thing actually before it and thus creating an abstraction—a possibility,—a new synthesis. The new synthesis hovers before it and interprets its impulse. No impulse can express itself to the Will directly. The Will must by abstraction and synthesis discover what change will relieve its blind, painful feeling which the mere impulse by itself is—and nothing more.

To say that a “motive constrains the Will” is to say that an abstraction—a product of the Will—constrains that which creates it; in other words, that something acts before it exists.

§ 8. The Will has *moral responsibility* in so far as (1) its determination is made its own *solely by its own act*, or by its resolve: i. e. the Ego wills it; (2) in so far as a will *is conscious* of the determinations which are produced through its act as they lie in its resolve, or are necessarily and immediately involved in its consequences.

§ 9. A Deed (“*That*”) is, as such, the produced change and determination of a Being. To an act (“*Handlung*”), however, belongs only what lay in the resolve or was in the consciousness—hence what the will acknowledges as its own.

§ 10. The free Will, as free, is moreover not limited to the determinateness and individuality through which one individual is distinguished from another; but it is universal will, and the individual is, as regards his pure will, a universal essence.

“Universal will” is the pure will—“pure” because self-related. “Self-related” is a term of great significance in Hegel’s Philosophy. Nothing seems more absurd to the novice than the idea of a self-relation; and yet all strict philosophical thought leads in a few steps to self-relation as the basis of all. Anything related to another—for that reason belongs to a whole of which it forms only an element, and of which the “other” is likewise an element. The “whole” is, however, self-related, and upon careful consideration so too are the parts, considered truly; for their *relation* is only through and by means of the *whole* which dwells in them; hence the relation of each is to its true Self, though not to its phenomenal Self. The phenomenal Self is a part seized by itself and not in the whole as it really and truly exists. (See § 12.)

§ 11. The Will can in various ways take up into itself external content—i. e. content which does not proceed from its own (the will’s) nature—and make this content its own. In this kind of activity the Will remains self-identical only *in*

form; namely, it is conscious of its power to abstract from each and every content and recover its pure form, but it does not remain self-identical as regards its content and essence. It is, in so far as it is such a will, mere CAPRICE (arbitrariness).

§ 12. But that the Will may be *truly* and *absolutely* free, it is requisite that what it wills—or its content—be naught else than the will itself [i. e. the pure self-determination or the act that is in harmony with itself]. It is requisite that it will only in itself and have itself for its object. The pure Will, therefore, does not will some special content or other on account of its specialty, but *in order that the will as such may be free in its deed and freely actualized*; in other words, that the universal Will may be done.

That caprice is not true freedom has been stated, and the reasons why this is so. That “the Will must be its own content” in order to be free—what is stated in this paragraph may become clearer from the following considerations: If the Will have any other content than itself, it is determined from without; it *conditions* itself; *limits* or *restrains*,—*negates* itself. It opposes to itself something alien, and thus in so far annihilates itself, or at least paralyzes itself. But if the Will have for its content that which is in the form of *self-determination*, it then *affirms* itself by realizing it. To act for the purpose of realizing the possibility of the Rational is the highest activity, for it creates itself by its own act.

What this “Rational content” is, which is said to be a content of itself, is to be seen in this science of Rights which we are now to enter upon. Those deeds of the Will that reenforce it and affirm it, rather than paralyze it and annul it, are universal, and, as forms, are called habits, usages, conventionalities, moral laws, ethical observances, and, finally, CIVIL LAWS or POSITIVE RIGHTS set up and preserved by the STATE.

The more detailed statement and development of these general principles concerning the Will, belong to the Science of “Rights, Duties, and Religion.”

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING MATTER EXPLANATORY OF THE INTRODUCTION.

[The following explanatory remarks by Hegel were intended by him to initiate his pupils into the meaning of his various technical expressions. They are familiar in style and lead gradually up to the ideas underlying the Philosophy of Rights. In many places the reader will notice that they take the form of mere notes or heads of discourse, which were to be expanded orally in the presence of his class.—TRANSLATOR.]

§ 1.* Objects are *particular* somewhat through their **DETERMINATION**: a sensuous object, for example, through its

* These paragraphs are numbered without reference to the numbers of the preceding paragraphs.

shape, size, weight, color—through the more or less firm combination of its parts—through the purpose for which it is used, &c., &c. If one takes away determinations of an object in his conception of it, this process is called *abstraction*. There remains after the process a *less determined* object, i. e. an *abstract object*. If, however, I conceive only one of these determinations, this is called an *abstract conception* [or idea]. The object left in its completeness of determination is called a *concrete object*. When I abstract *all* the determinations, I have *left* only the conception of the absolutely abstract object. When one says “thing,” though he may *mean* something quite definite, he *says* only something quite indefinite, since our thought reduces an actual somewhat to this abstraction of mere “thing.”

Sensuous perception is in part external, in part internal. Through external perception we perceive things which are outside us in time and space—things which we distinguish from ourselves. Through the internal sensuous perception we take note of the states and conditions which belong in part to our bodies and in part to our souls. One part of the sensuous world contains such objects and their determinations, as, e. g., colors—objects that have a sensuous basis and have received a mental form. If I say, “This table is black,” I speak in the first place of this single concrete object; but, secondly, the predicate *black* which I affirm of it is a general [quality] which belongs not merely to this single object but to several objects. *Black* is a simple idea. We cognize a real concrete object *immediately*. This act of immediate apprehension is called *intuition*. A general abstract idea is therefore a *mediated* idea, for the reason that I know it by means of another, i. e. by means of abstraction, or the omission of other determinations which are found united in the concrete object. A concrete idea is said to be analyzed when the determinations which are united in it as concrete are separated. The intelligible world receives its content from Spirit [i. e. from the activity of the Mind], and this content consists of pure general ideas—such, for example, as Being, Naught, Attribute, Essence, &c.

§ 2. The first source of our knowledge is called *Experience*. To experience belongs this important feature: that we *our-*

selves have perceived it. A distinction must, however, be drawn between Perception and Experience. Perception, namely, has for its object only a single somewhat, which is determined in one way this moment and in another way the next moment. Now if I *repeat* the perception, and in the repeated perceptions take note of what remains the same and hold it fast, *this* operation is properly termed Experience. Experience contains, for the most part, *laws*, i. e. such a connection of two phenomena, that, if one is extant, the other one must result from it in all cases. But Experience contains only the mere generality of such a phenomenon, and not the necessity of the connection. Experience teaches only that things are or happen thus and so, but not the reasons—the “why” thereof.

Since there are a multitude of objects, concerning which we can have no experience (such, for example, as the *past*), we are obliged to have recourse to the *authority* of others. Moreover, those objects which we hold for true upon the testimony of others are objects of Experience (i. e. empirical objects). We *believe* that upon the authority of others which is *probable*. We often hold for probable that which is really improbable, and what is improbable often turns out to be the truth. (An event receives its confirmation chiefly through its results and through the manifold circumstances connected with our experience of it. Those who narrate to us an event must be *trustworthy*; that is, they must have been in a position where it was possible for them to have knowledge of it. We draw conclusions from the tone and manner in which they relate the event, in regard to their degree of earnestness or the selfish purpose subserved by it. When writers under the reign of a tyrant are lavish in his praises, we at once pronounce them to be flatterers. But if one makes special mention of a good quality or deed of his enemy, we are the more ready to believe his statements.)

Experience, therefore, teaches only how objects *are* constituted, and not how they *must* be, nor how they *ought* to be. This latter knowledge comes only from a comprehension of the essence or ideal of the object [a knowledge of it as a whole]. But the latter knowledge alone is true knowledge. Since we must learn the grounds of an object from its comprehension

[a knowledge of it in its entire compass], so too if we would learn the character of the Lawful, Moral, and Religious, we must have recourse to the concepts or comprehensions thereof.

In considering the determinations of the Good and Right, we may at first hold to experience, and that too of the most external kind, namely, the way of the world. We can see what passes for right and good, or what proves itself to be right and good. Upon this phase it is to be remarked: (1) that in order to know what deeds are right or good, and what are wrong or wicked, one presupposes himself to be in possession of the concept of the Right and Good; (2) if any one chose to hold to that which the way of the world showed to be current as right and good, he would not arrive at anything definite. All would depend upon the view with which he undertook the investigation. In the course of the world wherein there occurs such a variety of events, each one can find his own particular view justified be it ever so peculiar.

But there is, secondly, an internal experience concerning the Right, Good, and Religious. We decide through our disposition or feeling that a deed of this or that character is good or bad; moreover, we have a feeling of Religion; we are affected religiously. What feeling says of the deed by way of approval or disapproval, contains merely the immediate expression, or the mere assurance that something is so or is not so. Feeling gives no reasons for its decision, nor does it decide with reference to reasons. What kind of feeling we have, whether of approval or of disapproval, we learn through a simple act of experience; we have the disposition, that is all. Feeling is, however, inconstant and changeable. It is at one time in one state and at another in a different one. Feeling is, in short, something *subjective*. An object of feeling is my object as a particular individual. If I say: "I feel thus about it," or "It is my disposition toward it," I then say only what belongs to me as an individual. I leave undecided whether it is also the same in other persons. When I, upon any occasion, appeal simply to my feeling, I do not desire to enter upon the reasons, consequently not upon general relations. I withdraw myself within myself, and express only what concerns me, and not what is in and for itself objective and general. The *objective* or the general is the Intelligible or the Comprehension.

If one wishes to know, in truth, what a rose, or a pink, or an oak, is—i. e. if he wishes to know it in its Comprehension (or idea), he must in the first place seize the higher concept which lies at its basis, namely, that of Plant in general; and again, in order to comprehend the Plant, he must ascend to the idea upon which that of Plant depends, and this is the idea of an organic body. In order to have the conception of bodies, surfaces, lines, and points, one must have recourse to the notion of space, since space is the Generic thereof; hence bodies, surfaces, &c., are only particular determinations of space. In the same manner, the present, past, and future, presuppose Time as their generic ground. And so it is with Rights, Duties, and Religion; they are merely particular determinations of Consciousness, which is their generic ground.

§ 3. In the stage of *consciousness* we commonly have the object before us, i. e. we know only the object, and not ourselves. But in these things the Ego is essentially present. In so far as we form a notion of an object alone, we are conscious, of course, of an object; but in so far as we form a notion of *consciousness* we are conscious of our consciousness [i. e. we are *self-conscious*.] In our ordinary life we *have* a consciousness, but we are not conscious that we *are* consciousness; we *have* much also that is devoid of consciousness, the corporeal, for example; the vital functions which minister to our self-preservation, we *possess* without having a definite consciousness of their structure; this latter we learn through science. Moreover, in a spiritual way we *are* much which we do not *know*. The *external* objects of our consciousness are such as we distinguish from ourselves and to which we ascribe an independent existence. *Internal* objects, therefore, are determinations or faculties—powers of the Ego. They do not subsist apart from, but only *in* the Ego. Consciousness appears either in a theoretical or in a practical function.

§ 4. *Theoretical* consciousness considers that which is, and leaves it as it is. *Practical* consciousness, on the contrary, is the active consciousness which does not leave what is as it is, but produces changes therein, and begets from itself determinations and objects. In consciousness, therefore, there is a twofold determination extant—that of the Ego through the object, and that of the object through the Ego. In the former kind, the Ego is theoretical; it takes up the determinations

of the object as they are. The Ego leaves the object as it is, and seeks to make its notions of it conform to it. The Ego has determinations in itself, and the object has likewise determinations within itself. The content of the ideas of the Ego ought to be determined so as to correspond to the object. The determinations of the object in itself are rules for the Ego. The truth of the ideas of the Ego consists in this, that they harmonize with the constitution and the determinations of the object. The law for our consciousness, in so far as the latter is theoretical, is—not that it must be perfectly passive but—that all its activity be directed to the reception of the object. A thing can be an object for our perception without on this account, our being conscious of it, i. e. in the case where we do not direct our activity to it. This activity in reception is called *Attention*.

§ 5. The ideas which we gain through attention we excite in ourselves through the power of IMAGINATION (phantasy), whose activity consists in this, that it calls up in connection with the intuition of one object the image of another in some way connected with the former. It is not necessary that the object to which the imagination connects the image of another be present—it may be present only in idea. The most extensive work of the imagination (phantasy) is LANGUAGE. Language consists in external signs and tones, through which one makes known what he thinks, feels, or has a sensation of. Language consists in words, which are nothing else than signs of thoughts. For these signs there are again found in the art of Writing other signs called letters. They make known our thoughts without our having to speak them. The hieroglyphic style is distinguished from the alphabetic by its presenting entire thoughts immediately [by each character]. In speech, tones are used, and these tones are the directly perceived objects. But we do not stop at the mere sound which makes an impression on our sense of hearing, but our imagination (phantasy) connects with it the idea of an absent object. There is thus here present a twofold object—a sensuous impression and an idea joined to it by imagination. The idea passes solely for the essence, and as the signification of that which is sensuously present (the tones), and the latter consequently becomes a mere sign. The *given* content thus stands opposed to a content which is *produced* by us.

§ 6. In common life, the expressions "to think" and "to have an idea" [Germ. *Vorstellen* as opposed to *Denken*] are used interchangeably, and we thus dignify with the name of *thought* what is only an image of the phantasy. In "ideas" of this sort [*Vorstellungen*] we have an object before us in its external and unessential existence. In Thinking, on the contrary, we separate from the object its external, merely unessential side, and consider the object merely in its essence. Thinking penetrates through the external phenomenon to the internal nature of the thing and makes it its object. It leaves the contingent side of the thing out of consideration. It takes up a subject not as it is as immediate appearance, but it severs the unessential from the essential and thus abstracts from it. In intuition we have individual objects before us. Thinking brings the same into relation with each other, or *compares* them. In the comparison it singles out what they have in *common* with each other and omits that by which they differ, and thus it retains only general ideas. The general idea contains less determinateness than the individual object which belongs under this general idea—since one arrives at the general idea only by leaving out something from the individual thing; on the other hand, the General includes more under it, or it has a greater extension. In so far as Thinking produces a general object, the activity of abstracting belongs to it, and hence it has the *form* of the Generic (as, for example, in the general object "Man"). But the *content* of the general object does not belong to it as an activity of abstracting, but is *given* to the Thinking and is independent of it and extant by itself.

To the Thinking there belong manifold determinations which express a connection between the manifold phenomena that is universal and necessary. The connection as it exists in the sensuous intuition is merely an external or contingent one, which may be or also may not be in any particular form. A stone, for example, makes by its fall an impression upon a yielding mass. In the sensuous intuition is contained the fact of the falling of the stone, and the fact of an impression made in the yielding mass where the stone touched it. These two phenomena—the falling of the stone and the impression on the yielding mass—have a succession in time. But this connection contains as yet no necessity: on the contrary, it is possible—for all that is therein stated—that the one might

have happened under the same conditions without the other's following it. When, on the contrary, the relation of these two phenomena to each other is determined as cause and effect, or as the relation of Causality, then this connection is a necessary one or a connection of the Understanding. This involves that, under the same conditions, if one happens, the other is contained in it.

These determinations are the forms of Thinking. The Mind posits them solely through its own activity, but they are at the same time determinations of existing things. We come first through reflection to distinguish what is Ground and Sequence, Internal and External, Essential and Unessential. The Mind is not at first conscious that it posits these determinations by its own free-will, but thinks that it expresses in them something which is extant without its assistance.

§ 7. Whenever we speak of the Ego or the Mind as receiving determinations, we presuppose its previous indeterminateness. The determinations of the Mind always belong to the Mind even though it has received them from other objects. Although something may be in the Mind which came from without, as a content not dependent upon the Mind, yet the *form* always belongs to the latter; e. g. in the imagination: although the material be derived from sensuous intuition, the form consists in the method in which this material is combined in a different manner from that present in the original intuition. In a pure concept, e. g. that of *animal*, the particular content belongs to Experience, but the general element in it, is the form which comes from the Mind.

This form is thus of the Mind's own determining. The essential difference between the theoretical and the practical functions of the Mind consists in this, that the *form* alone is determined by the Mind in the theoretical, while, on the other hand, in the practical function the *content* also proceeds from the mind. In Rights, for example, the content is personal freedom. This belongs to the Mind. The practical function recognizes determinations as its own in so far as it wills them. Even if they are alien determinations, or given from without, they must cease to be alien in so far as the Ego wills them: I [the Ego] change the content into mine and posit it through myself.

§ 8. The theoretic activity begins with a determinate Being, an extant somewhat external to it, and makes of it a concept. The practical activity, on the contrary, begins with an internal determination; and this is called *resolution*, intention, direction, and makes the Internal actually external and gives to it existence. This transition from an internal determination to externality is called an act [*Handlung*=voluntary act or dealing].

§ 9. The *voluntary act* is, in general terms, a union of the Internal and External. The internal determination with which it begins has to be cancelled and made external as far as its form is concerned, which is that of a mere Internal; the content of this determination is still to remain [after negation of the form]; e.g. the intention to build a house is an internal determination whose form consists in this: that it is only an intention at first; the content includes the plan of the house. If the form is here now cancelled, the content will still remain. The house which, according to the intention, is to be built, and that which is built according to the plan, are the same house.

Conversely, the deed is likewise a cancelling of the External as it is extant in its immediateness; e.g. the building of a house necessitates a change of the ground, the building-stone, the wood, and the other materials, in a variety of ways. The shape of the external is changed: it is brought into quite other combinations than existed before. These changes happen in conformity to a purpose—to wit, the plan of the house, with which internal somewhat the external is to be made to harmonize.

§ 10. Animals, too, stand in a practical relation to that which is external to them. They act from instinct, with designs and purposes to realize, and thus rationally. Since they do this unconsciously, however, we cannot properly speak of them as authors of voluntary acts. They have *desires* and *impulses*, but no rational *will*. In speaking of man's impulses and desires, it is usual to include the will. But, more accurately speaking, the will is to be distinguished from the desires; the will, in distinction from the real desire, is in that case called the "higher Appetite." With animals, instinct is also to be distinguished from their impulses and desires, for

though instinct is an acting from impulse and desire, it however does not terminate with its immediate externalization, but has a further (for the animal likewise necessary) result. It is an acting in which there is involved also a relation to something else; e. g. the hoarding up of grain by many animals. This act is not yet quite properly to be called a voluntary one, but it contains a design in it, namely, provision for the future.

Impulse is, in the first place, something internal, something which begins a movement from itself, or produces a change by its own power. Impulse proceeds from itself. Although it may be awakened by external circumstances, yet it existed already without regard to them; it is not *produced* by them. Mechanical causes produce mere external or mechanical effects, which are completely determined through their causes, in which therefore nothing is contained which is not already present in the cause; e. g. if I give motion to a body, the motion imparted to it is all that it has; or if I paint a body, it has nothing else than the color imparted to it. On the contrary, if I work upon a living creature, my influence upon it becomes something quite different from what it was in me. The activity of the living creature is aroused by my act, and it exhibits its own peculiarity in reacting against it.

In the second place, impulse is (1) limited in respect to content; (2) contingent as regards the side of its gratification since it is dependent upon external circumstances. Impulse does not transcend the narrow sphere of its object and end, and is therefore spoken of as "blind." It gratifies itself, let the consequences be what they may.

Man does not make his own impulses, he simply *has* them; in other words, they belong to his nature. Nature however is under the rule of necessity, because everything in Nature is limited, relative, or exists only in relation to something else. But what exists only in relation to something else, is not "for itself" but dependent upon others. It has its ground in that, and is a necessitated Being. In so far as man has immediately determined impulses he is subjected to Nature, and conducts himself as a necessitated and not-free Being.

§ 11. But man can as a thinking Being REFLECT upon his impulses which have in themselves necessity for him. Reflec-

tion signifies, in general, the cutting off from or reduction of the Immediate. Reflection (spoken of light) consists in this, that its beams which for themselves ray forth in straight lines are bent back from this direction. Mind has reflection. It is not confined to the Immediate, but may transcend it and proceed to something else; e. g. from the event before it, it may proceed to form an idea of its consequences, or of a similar event, or also of its causes. When the mind goes out from something immediate, it has removed the same from itself. It has reflected itself into itself — *has gone into itself*. It has recognized the Immediate as a Conditioned or Limited inasmuch as it is opposed to it as another. It is, therefore a very great difference whether one *is* or *has* somewhat, and whether he *knows* that he is or has it; e. g. ignorance or rudeness, of the sentiments or behavior, are limitations which one may have without knowing it. In so far as one reflects or knows of them, he must know of their opposite. Reflection upon them is already a first step beyond them.

Impulses as natural determinations are limitations. Through reflection upon them man begins to transcend them. The first reflection concerns the means, whether they are commensurate with the impulse, whether the impulse will be gratified through the means; whether, in the second place, the means are not too important to be sacrificed for this impulse.

Reflection compares the different impulses and their objects with the fundamental object and purpose of Being. The objects of the special impulses are limited, but they contribute each in its own way to the attainment of the fundamental purpose. Some, however, are better adapted for this than others are. Hence reflection has to compare impulses, and ascertain which are more closely allied to the fundamental purpose and are best adapted to aid its realization by their gratification. In reflection begins the transition from lower forms of appetite to the higher. Man is in Reflection no longer a mere natural Being, and stands no longer in the sphere of necessity. Something is necessary when only this and not something else can happen. Before Reflection, however, there stands (for its choice) not only the one immediate object, but also another or its opposite.

§ 12. This reflection just described is, however, a merely

relative affair. Although it transcends the Finite, yet it always arrives again at the Finite; e. g. when we exceed the limits of one place in space, there rises before us another portion of space greater than before, but it is always only a finite space that thus arises, *ad infinitum*. Likewise when we go back in time beyond the present into the past, we can represent to our minds a period of ten thousand or thirty thousand years. Though such reflection proceeds from one particular point in space or time to another, yet it never gets beyond space or time. Such is also the case in the practical relative-reflection. It leaves some one immediate inclination, desire or impulse, and proceeds to another one, and in the end abandons this one also. In so far as it is relative, it ever anew falls again into an impulse, moves round and round in a circle of appetites, and does not elevate itself above this sphere of impulses as a whole.

The practical *Absolute* reflection, however, does elevate itself above this entire sphere of the Finite; in other words, it abandons the sphere of the lower appetites, in which man is determined through nature and dependent on the Without. Finitude consists, on the whole, in this, that somewhat has a limit, i. e. that here its non-being is posited, or that here it ceases, that it relates to another through this limit. *Infinite* reflection consists, however, in this, that the Ego is no longer related to another, but is related to itself; in other words, is its own object. This pure relation to itself is the Ego, the root of the infinite Essence itself. It is the perfect abstraction from all that is finite. The Ego as such has no content which is immediate, i. e. given to it by nature, but its sole content is itself. This pure form is, at the same time, its own content. (1) Every content given by nature is something limited: but the Ego is unlimited; (2) the content given by nature is immediate: the pure Ego, however, has no immediate content for the reason that the pure Ego *is*, only, by means of the complete abstraction from everything else.

§ 13. In the first place, the Ego is the pure Undetermined. It is able however, by means of reflection, to pass over from indeterminateness to determinateness, e. g. to seeing, hearing, &c. In this state of determinateness it has become non-self-identical, but it has still retained its indeterminateness

also; i.e. it is able at will, also, to withdraw into itself again. At this place enters the act of Resolving, for reflection precedes it, and consists in this, that the Ego has before it several determinations indefinite as to number, and yet each of these must be in one of two predicaments: it necessarily *is* or *is not* a determination of the somewhat under consideration. The act of resolution cancels that of reflection—the process to and fro, from one to the other—and fixes one determinateness and makes it his own. The fundamental condition necessary to the act of resolving (volition), the possibility of making up one's mind to do something, or even of reflecting previous to an act, is the absolute indeterminateness of the Ego.

§ 14. The freedom of the will is freedom in general, and all other freedoms are mere species thereof. When the expression “freedom of the Will” is used, it is not meant that there is a force, or property, or faculty of the will which possesses freedom; just as when the omnipotence of God is spoken of, it is not understood that there are still other Beings besides Him who possess omnipotence. There is also civil freedom, freedom of the press, political and religious freedom. These species of freedom belong to the general concept of freedom in so far as it stands in relation to special objects. Religious freedom consists in this, that religious notions, religious deeds, be not forced upon any one, i.e. that there be in them only such determinations as he recognizes as his own, and makes his own. A religion which is forced upon one, or in relation to which he cannot act as a free Being, is not his own, but remains alien to him. The political freedom of a people consists in this, that they form for themselves their own state, and decide what is to be valid as the national will, and that this be done either through the whole people themselves, or through those who belong to the people, and who, since every other citizen has the same rights as themselves, can be acknowledged by the people as their own.

§ 15. Such expressions as these are often used: “My will was determined by these *motives, circumstances, incitements, or inducements.*” This expression involves, first, that the Ego stood in a passive relation. In truth, however, the Ego did not stand in a merely passive relation, but was essentially active therein. The will, namely, took up these circumstances as

motives and allowed them validity as motives. The causal relation has here no force. The circumstances do not stand in the relation of cause nor the Will in that of effect. In the causal relation, the effect follows necessarily when the cause is given. As reflection, however, the Ego can transcend each and every determination which is posited through the circumstances. In so far as a man pleads in his defence that he was led astray through circumstances, incitements, &c., wishing by this plea to rid himself of the consequences of his deed, he lowers himself in this plea to a not-free, natural Being, while, in truth, his deed is always his own and not that of another, not the effect of something outside himself. Circumstances or motives have only so much control over man as he himself gives to them.

The determinations of the lower appetites are natural determinations. In so far, it seems to be neither necessary nor possible for man to make them his own (determinations). But as natural determinations, they do not belong to his will or to his freedom, for the essence of his will is that nothing be in it which it (the will) has not made its own. He may, therefore, regard what belongs to his nature as something alien, so that it consequently is only in him, only belongs to him in so far as he makes it his own, or follows with his volition his natural impulses.

§ 16. To hold a man responsible for a deed, this is to attribute or impute to him guilt or innocence. Children who are still in a state of nature are not held responsible for their deeds; neither are crazy or idiotic people.

§ 17. In the distinction of deed from act [*That* and *Handlung*] lies the distinction between the ideas of moral responsibility as they come up in the tragedies of the ancients, and those current in our own time. In the former (among the ancients), "deed" (*That*) is applied in its entire extent to human actions. He had to do penance for the entire compass of his actions, and no distinction was made if he was conscious of only one side of his act and unconscious of the other. He (man) was considered as having absolute knowledge, and not as a relative and contingent subject, but whatever he did was considered as *his own* deed. There was no part of him referred to another Being; e. g. Ajax, when he slew the oxen and sheep of the Greeks, in a state of insanity and rage caused by his

not receiving the arms of Achilles, did not attribute his crime to his madness—as though he were in another being while insane—but he took the whole deed upon himself as its author, and slew himself for shame.

§ 18. If the will were not a Universal there could be, properly speaking, no laws, nothing which could be imposed as obligatory upon all. Each one might act according to his own pleasure, and would not respect the pleasure of others. That the will is universal, flows from the idea of its freedom. Men, considered as they are in the world, show themselves very different in character, customs, inclinations, and particular dispositions, i. e. they differ in their will. They are by this, different individuals, and differ by nature from each other. Each one has natural abilities and determinations which others lack. These differences between individuals do not concern the Will in itself, for it is free. Freedom consists precisely in the indeterminateness of the Will, or in the fact that it has no determined nature in it. The Will by itself is thus a universal Will. The particularity or individuality of man does not stand in the way of the universality of the Will, but is subordinated to it. A deed which is good legally or morally, although done by some one individual, is assented to by all others. They recognize thus themselves or their own wills in it. It is the same case here as with works of art. Even those who could never produce such a work, find expressed in it their own nature. Such a work shows itself, therefore, as truly universal. It receives the greater applause, the less it exhibits the idiosyncrasy of its author.

It may happen that one is unconscious of his universal will. He may believe, indeed, that it is directly opposed to his will even though it is his [true] will. The criminal who is punished, may wish, of course, that the punishment be warded off; but the universal will brings with it the decree that the criminal shall be punished. It must be assumed that the absolute will of the criminal demands that he shall be punished. In so far as he is punished, the demand is made that he shall see that he is justly punished; and if he sees this, although he may wish to be freed from the punishment as an external suffering, yet in so far as he concedes that he is justly punished, his Universal will approves of the punishment.

§ 19. Arbitrariness (caprice) is freedom, but only *formal*

freedom, or freedom in so far as one's will relates to something limited. Two sides must here be distinguished: (1) in how far the will does not remain identical with itself in it, and (2) in how far it does remain so.

(1) In so far as the Will wills *something*, it has a determined, limited content. It is in so far, non-identical with itself, because it is here actually determined, although in and for itself it is undetermined. The limited content which it has taken up is therefore something else than it itself; e. g. if I will to go or to see, I become a going or a seeing one. I thus enter a relation not identical to myself, since the going and seeing is something limited and not identical with the Ego.

(2) But in *form* I stand in identity with myself, or am free still, since I all the while distinguish this state of determination from myself as something alien, for the acts of going and seeing are not posited in me by nature, but by myself in my own will. In so far as this is the case it is evidently no alien affair, because it is made my own and I have my own will in it.

This freedom is a formal freedom because together with my self-identity there is present also at the same time non-identity with myself; or, in other words, there is a *limited* content in the Ego. When we in common life speak of freedom, we ordinarily understand under the expression, caprice or *relative freedom*: liberty to do, or to refrain from doing, something or other. In the limited will we can have *formal* freedom in so far as we distinguish the particular content of our will from ourselves, or reflect upon it, i. e. in so far as we are also beyond and above it. If we are in a passion, or if we act through a natural impulse, we have no formal freedom. Since our Ego, in this emotion, gives itself up wholly, it (the emotion) seems to us to be something *unlimited* (or infinite). Our Ego is not out of it and does not separate itself from it.

§ 20. The absolute free will distinguishes itself from the relatively free will or caprice (arbitrariness) through this: the absolute will has only itself for object, while the relative will has something limited. With the relative will—with the appetite, for example—the object of that will [its content] is all that concerns it. But the absolute (will) must be carefully distinguished from wilfulness. The latter has this in common with the absolute will: that it does not merely concern itself

with the object but also with the will as will, insisting that its will as such shall be respected. A distinction is here to be made: the stubborn (wilful) man insists on his will simply because it is his will, without offering a rational ground for it, i. e. without showing his will to have general validity. While strength of will is necessary—such as holds unwaveringly by a rational purpose—on the other hand, mere stubbornness, such as arises from idiosyncrasy and is repulsive toward others, is to be detested. The true free will has no contingent content. It alone is not contingent.

§ 21. The pure will has nothing to do with particularity. In so far as the latter comes into the Will, so far is it mere caprice, for caprice has a limited interest and takes its determinations from natural impulses and inclinations. Such a content is a given one and is not posited absolutely through the Will. The fundamental principle of the Will is therefore that its freedom be established and preserved. Besides this, it has indeed many different kinds of determinations: it has a variety of definite aims, regulations, conditions, &c., but these are not aims of the Will *in and for itself*; still they are aims, for the reason that they are *means* and *conditions* for the realization of the freedom of the Will, which demands regulations and laws for the purpose of restraining caprice and inclination or mere “good pleasure”—in a word, the impulses and appetites which relate to mere natural ends; e. g. *Education* has for its end the elevation of man to an independent state of existence, i. e. to that existence wherein he is a free will. To this view many restraints are imposed upon the desires and likings of children. They must learn to obey, and consequently to annul their mere individual or particular will, and moreover their sensuous inclinations and appetites, to the end that by this means their will may become free.

§ 22. *First.* Man is a free Being. This constitutes the fundamental characteristic of his nature. Nevertheless, besides freedom he has other necessary wants, special aims, and impulses, e. g. the impulse for knowledge, for the preservation of his life, health, &c. In these special determinations, Justice has not man as such for its object. It has not the design to further him in the pursuit of the same, or to afford him special help therein.

Secondly. Justice and Right do not depend upon one's mo-

tives. One may do something with the best of intentions, and yet the deed be not right and just for all this, but wrong. On the other hand, an act—for example, the maintenance of my property—may be perfectly right, and yet I have a bad motive; since I may have sought not what was just and right, but the injury of another. Upon the right as such, the intention or motive has no influence.

Thirdly. It is not a matter that depends upon conviction that what I perform is right or wrong. This holds in particular with regard to punishment. Although an effort is made to convince the criminal that he has violated what is right, yet his conviction or non-conviction has no influence on the justice that is meted out to him.

Finally. Justice and Right pay no regard to the disposition or sentiment under whose influence anything is done. It very often happens that one does what is right merely through fear of punishment or fear of unpleasant consequences—such, for instance, as the loss of reputation or credit. Or, it happens that one does right from the conviction that he will be rewarded in another life. Right, however, as such is independent of these sentiments and convictions.

§ 23. Justice and Right must be distinguished from Morality. Something may be well enough from a legal point of view, which is not allowable from a moral point of view. The law grants me the disposition of my property without determining how I shall dispose of it, but Morality contains determinations which restrain me in this respect. It may seem as though Morality permitted many things which the law does not; but Morality demands not merely the observance of justice towards others, but requires also that the *disposition* to do right shall be present, that the Right shall be respected as Right. Morality demands, first, that the legal Right shall be obeyed; and where it ceases, come in moral determinations.

In order that a deed may have moral value, insight is necessary into its nature, whether it be right or wrong, good or evil. What one terms the innocence of children or of uncivilized nations is not yet Morality. Children or such uncivilized nations escape the commission of a multitude of bad acts because they have no ideas of them, i. e. because the essential relations are not yet extant under which alone such deeds are possible; such non-committal of evil deeds has no moral

value. But they *do* perform acts which are not in accordance with Morality, and yet for the reason that no insight exists into their nature (whether they are good or bad), they are not strictly moral acts.

Private conviction stands opposed to the mere faith in the authority of another. If my deed is to have moral value, my conviction must enter into the act. The act must be mine in a whole sense. If I act on the authority of another, my act is not perfectly my own; somebody else's conviction is doing the act.

There are, however, relations in which the moral side consists precisely in being obedient and acting according to the authority of another. Originally, man followed his natural inclinations without reflection; or else with reflections that were one-sided, wrong, unjust, and under the dominion of the senses. In this condition, the best thing for him was to learn to obey, for the reason that his will was not yet the rational one. Through this obedience the negative advantage is gained that he learns to renounce his sensuous appetites; and only through such obedience can Man attain to independence and freedom. In this sphere he always follows another, whether it be his own will still immersed in the senses, or whether it be the will of another. As *natural* creature, he stands under the dominion of external things, and his inclinations and appetites are something immediate—not free, or something alien to his true will. The one who is obedient to the law of Reason is obedient from the point of view of his *unessential* nature only, which stands under the dominion of that which is alien to him. But, on the other hand [i. e. *essentially*], he is independent self-determination (when obedient to reason), for this law (of reason) has its root in his essence.

The disposition [the “*animus*”] is thus, in the moral realm, an essential element. It consists in this: that one does his duty for its own sake. It is, therefore, an immoral motive to do anything out of fear of punishment, or in order to preserve another's good opinion. This is a heterogeneous motive, for it is not from the nature of the thing itself; in such a case one does not consider the Right as something in and for itself, but as dependent upon external determinations.

Yet the consideration whether an action is to be punished

or rewarded (although the consequences do not constitute the value of a deed), is of importance. The consequences of a good act may sometimes involve much that is evil, and, on the contrary, an evil act involve much good. The thinking upon the consequences of a deed is important, for the reason that one does not remain standing by an immediate point of view, but proceeds beyond it. Through its manifold consideration, one is led to the nature of deeds.

§ 24. According to the stand-point of Rights, man is his own object as an absolutely free existence; according to the moral stand-point, on the contrary, he is self-object, as an individual in his special existence, as member of the family, as friend, as a particular character, &c. If the external circumstances in which one man stands with another are so situated that he fulfills his vocation [destination], that is his happiness. This well-being depends partly on his own will and partly upon external circumstances and other men. Morality has, also, the particular existence or well-being of man for its object, and demands not only that man be left in his abstract freedom, but that his happiness be promoted. Well-being, as the adaptation of the External to our internal Being, we call comfort and pleasure. HAPPINESS is not a mere individual pleasure, but an enduring condition: in part of the actual pleasure itself; in part, also, of the circumstances and means through which one always has the ability to create a state of comfort and pleasure for himself at will. The latter form is the pleasure of the mind. In happiness, however, as in pleasure, there lies the idea of good fortune [good luck]: that it is an accidental matter whether or no the external circumstances agree with the internal determinations of the desires. BLESSEDNESS, on the contrary, consists in this: that no fortune (luck) pertains to it, i. e. that in it the agreement of the external Being with the internal desire is not accidental. Blessedness can be predicated only of God, in whom wish, and accomplishment of his absolute power is the same. For man, however, is the harmony of the External with his Internal limited and contingent. In this he is dependent.

§ 25. The moral will, in regard to its disposition and conviction, is imperfect. It is a will which aims at perfection, but: (1) is driven towards the attainment of the same through

the impulses of sensuousness and individuality; (2) it has not the adequate means in its power, and is, therefore, limited to bringing about the good of others. In RELIGION, on the contrary, the Divine essence is regarded in itself as the perfection of the Will, according to its two sides, namely: (*a*) according to the perfection of the internal disposition [the "Heart"] which has no longer any alien impulses in itself, and (*b*) according to the perfection of power to attain the holy purposes.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF TRENTOWSKI.

TREATING OF GOD, IMMORTALITY, AND THE IMMEDIATE EYE FOR THE DIVINE WORLD.

"Cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberos faciet vos."—Johann. viii. 32.

Translated from the Polish by Professor PODBIELSKI, (Havana College, Cuba).

Any thinker among my countrymen meditating with an unprejudiced eye upon the wide fields of human cognition, and considering with any depth the present state of European philosophy—having pledged no fealty to any received system, even the all-pervading one of Hegel—must have arrived at the conviction that metaphysical science has hitherto been, and is still engaged in, examining and cultivating two worlds standing in *direct* opposition to each other. These worlds are Materialism and Spiritualism, Realism and Idealism, Empiricism and Speculation, Physics and Metaphysics,—in a word, the External and Internal of the Created. I call attention to the word Created, because their creative, transcendental or divine germ has been hitherto ignored and unknown. Under these two cardinal worlds all the smaller ones subordinated to them are ranged, for instance: Understanding and Reason, Rationalism and Mysticism, Naturalism and Supernaturalism, Practice and Theory—the Prose and Poetry in every doctrine.

It may be remarked that, in general, the Indo-Romanic race pays homage to the first of these cardinal worlds, Realism or Materialism; while the Indo-Teutonic inclines to the second, Idealism, Spiritualism, Theory. There are, indeed, Empiricists